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1. Introduction 
Altruistic lobbying is lobbying in the public interest or in the interest of the least protected part of the 
society. This “or” is the point: it is necessary to bear in mind that an altruist has a wide range of strategies, from 
behaving in the interest of the society as a whole to the support of the most disadvantaged ones. How can we 
compare the effectiveness of such strategies? The second question is: “Given a strategy, is it possible to assess 
the optimal number of participants choosing it?” Finally, do the answers to these questions depend on the level 
of well-being in the society? For example, can we say that the poorer the society, the more important is to focus 
on the support of the poorest? We answer these questions within the framework of the model of social 
dynamics determined by voting in a stochastic environment [1–5].  
Consider a society consisting of n members (agents); each of them is characterized by a real scalar 
interpreted as the utility (or capital) level; a negative value is naturally interpreted as a debt. Let the initial 
distribution of capital be given. A proposal of the environment is a vector of increments of individual capitals. 
Let these increments be random variables; in the simplest case, we assume that they are independent and 
identically distributed with mean μ and standard deviation σ. The environment generates a series of proposals 
each of which is put to the vote. Every agent takes part in the voting and has one vote. With some voting 
procedure, the profile of votes is converted into a collective decision: the proposal is approved or rejected. The 
approved proposals are implemented: the participants get the capital increments specified in the proposal. 
Considering a large series of votes, one can explore the dynamics of the vector of agents’ capital: in different 
environments, with different social attitudes, and with various voting procedures. An interesting version of the 
model is that with ruining: the agents whose capital values become negative are ruined. 
2. A study of altruistic lobbying  
Consider a society consisting of two categories of agents: selfish and altruistic ones. An egoist votes for 
a proposal if and only if this proposal increases his capital.  
As noted in the introduction, the altruists have a wide range of strategies. Consider the following type 
of strategy. We order all agents by the increase of the current capital value. Since the capital increments are 
real-valued random variables, we can assume that all capitals are different. Let an integer      be fixed. For 
the current proposal, one calculates the total capital increment of    poorest agents. An altruist supports the 
proposal if and only if this total is positive, no matter what happens to his own capital. If     , then the 
altruist supports those proposals that enrich the society as a whole. When    is smaller, then he supports more 
or less numerous “lower” stratum of the society. 
Let K be the same initial capital of all the agents. Assume that the distribution of capital increments is 
Gaussian:  (   )  Consider the case where bankrupt agents drop out. Let m be the number of steps of voting 
constituting the “game”. The strategy of altruists is determined by   . As a criterion of the effectiveness of this 
strategy we consider the relative number of participants that “survive” till the end of the game. Another 
important parameter is the number (percentage) of altruists in the society. 
We study the following question: “How the effectiveness of altruists’ strategy depends on their 
proportion and the threshold    at different parameters μ and σ?” In other words, “What is the optimal 
proportion of altruists in the society and what is their optimal strategy in a favorable (μ > 0), neutral (μ = 0), 
and unfavorable (μ < 0) environment?” 
Some simulation results are as follows. Let the society consist of       agents; the number of 
altruists, m, varies. The experiments are conducted at σ = 12; game lasts 500 steps. On the horizontal axes in 
Fig. 1, we have the number of altruists, m, and their strategy parameter   ; along vertical axis, the relative 
number of agents at the end of the game. In the diagrams, μ and the initial capital K of the agents are also 
shown. Some results are as follows. 
1. In a neutral environment (μ = 0) and with the support of the poorest (   is small), the number of 
altruists should be small, or they waste their influence, resulting in ruining players outside the “support 
screen”. At a high   , we have saturation with the increase of the number of altruists. With K = 40, the 
optimum is reached at    = 50 and m > 40 (at higher values of m, saturation holds). In other words, 
altruists should support the lower half of the community. With the extension of the support screen, the 
effectiveness of the altruistic strategy declines. 
 
   
 
        
Fig. 1. 
2. In an unfavorable environment (μ = –0.5) and a high initial capital (K = 130), the picture is very 
similar. The only significant difference is that there is no pronounced effect of reducing the 
effectiveness of the strategy with the increase of the right border of the support screen. Maximum is 
reached at n0 = 30 and m = 10, but it does not change significantly with an increase of these parameters. 
3. In an unfavorable environment (μ = –0.5) and a lower initial capital (K = 40), the maximum is reached 
at n0 = 80 and m = 60. This is a very interesting conclusion: in a really harsh environment, we have to 
support everyone! 
4. Finally, in a supportive environment with a high initial capital (μ = 0.5, K = 130), the picture changes 
dramatically: we should support a thin layer of the poorest; the others will “resurface themselves”. 
 
The main conclusion is simple: in rich and affluent societies, support of the poorest is effective. The 
poorer is the society, the more “wasteful” is the support of the poorest. If you focus on this support, then the 
zone of trouble grows. A more detailed analysis of the results reveals some more subtle phenomena as well. 
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